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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brandon Michael Alexander was charged with trafficking in heroin and possessing drug
paraphernalia based on drug evidence discovered as the result of a Terry pat-down search. Prior
to his trial, Mr. Alexander moved to suppress the evidence asserting that the search was
unjustified and violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
district court denied the motion, the evidence was admitted at trial, and the jury convicted him on
both charges.
On appeal, Mr. Alexander argues that the denial of suppression was erroneous because
the State failed to carry its burden of showing that the objective facts known to the officer at the
time of the Terry search justified a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alexander was armed and
presently dangerous. He asserts the district court’s conclusion that the search was justified rests
on factual findings that are not supported by the record and results from a misinterpretation and
misapplication of the relevant factors identified in State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819 (2009).
The district court’s decision to deny suppression should be reversed and Mr. Alexander’s
judgment of conviction should be vacated.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following evidence was presented at the suppression hearing. 1 On a June afternoon,
at around 3:40, Meridian Police Officer Kyle Ludwig was dispatched to the Blue Sky Bagel shop

1

At the suppression hearing, the State called Meridian Police Officer Kyle Ludwig and the
parties stipulated to the admission of the bodycam videos of Officer John Gonzalez (Exhibit B)
and Officer Ludwig (Exhibit C). (Tr., p.6, L.16 – p.7, L.9.) The district court indicated in its
written decision that it also considered the transcript of the July 12, 2017 preliminary hearing at
which Officer Ludwig had testified. (R., p.85, n.1.) Copies of both bodycam videos have been
augmented into the appellate record as Confidential Exhibits. (See Order Granting Motion to
Augment, dated January 7, 2019.) Citations to “Ex.C” in this Appellant’s Brief are to the copy
1

in Meridian in response to a caller’s report that “a male and female had been spending an
extended period of time in the store, going back and forth to the bathroom for lengthy periods of
time.” (Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.21.)2 On his way to the location, Officer Ludwig called the
reporting party – a bagel shop employee – who told the officer that the same couple was in the
bagel restaurant the previous day, doing the same thing, and that during their shift employees
found what they “believed to be drug paraphernalia” in the trash: a small, Ziploc-style bag with
orange and black markings of a skull or skeleton. (Prelim.Tr., p.17, Ls.1-10; Tr., p.11, L.23 –
p.12, L.7.)
Officer Ludwig arrived at Blue Sky Bagel with his assist officer, Sergeant Gonzalez; as
the officers entered the restaurant they were directed to a female seated alone at one of the tables
and were advised the male was in the bathroom. (Tr., p.12, Ls.14-24, p.29, Ls.10-14.) Officer
Ludwig observed the female begin to manipulate her cell phone, looking up at the officers, and
then going back to texting. (Tr., p.13, Ls.20-25, p.28, L.14 – p.29, L.9.) Officer Ludwig
assumed the female was texting the male to notify of the police presence, and he immediately
walked over to the bathroom and knocked on the door. (Tr., p.13, Ls.20-25, p.28, L.14 – p.29,
L.9.) Officer Ludwig testified that he heard movement inside “but nothing that I deemed
alarming, at the time [such as] the destruction of evidence or anything like that.” (Tr., p.14, L.24
– p.15, L.2; Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) Within a few seconds, Mr. Alexander stepped out and Officer
Ludwig confronted him. (Tr., p.15, Ls.3-17; Ex.C, 00:44.)

of Officer Ludwig’s bodycam video admitted at the suppression hearing. The redacted version
of Officer Ludwig’s bodycam video admitted at trial as State’s Exhibit 3 is also part of the
appellate record.
2
The transcripts of the suppression hearing, jury trial, and sentencing hearing are contained in a
single transcript volume, cited as “Tr.”; the transcript of the preliminary hearing is contained in a
separate transcript volume, cited as “Prelim.Tr.” “Exhibit C” refers to the video recording of
2

Officer Ludwig’s bodycam video shows that Mr. Alexander stepped out of the bathroom
slowly and calmly, with his hands empty and out in front him and plainly visible to the officer;
the video shows Mr. Alexander was wearing basketball shorts and a short-sleeved shirt that
revealed a bandage on his wrist. (Ex.C, 00:44.) The bodycam also recorded the brief discussion
that ensued:
Officer Ludwig:

Can I see your ID real fast?

Mr. Alexander:

My wallet is out there.

Officer Ludwig:

What’s going on with your wrist?

Mr. Alexander:

I have, like a, abscess.

Officer Ludwig:

You have an abscess? ’Kay. Is that from drug use?

Mr. Alexander:

Um. [Shrugs]

Officer Ludwig:

I can see your arm.

Mr. Alexander:

Yah.

Officer Ludwig:

You shoot up in the bathroom?

Mr. Alexander:

No, I did not.

Officer Ludwig:

Do me a favor. Put your hands on top of your head and
lace your fingers for me….

(Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.)3
The video shows that Mr. Alexander promptly complied with the officer’s instructions,
placing his hands on his head and turning around with his back to the officer. (Ex.C, 00:44 –

Officer Ludwig’s bodycam. Appellant’s Counsel has attempted to accurately quote from its
audio, recognizing the Exhibit is the official record.
3
After he began the search, the officer asked additional, rapid-fire questions about what was in
the pockets; as this Court can see from the video, Mr. Alexander’s shorts are being manipulated
by the officer before Mr. Alexander answers these questions. (See, Ex.C, 01:15-25.)

3

1:10.) Officer Ludwig testified he then conducted a pat-search for weapons. (Tr., p.20, Ls.6-18;
Prelim.Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.12, L.17.) In conducting that search, the officer felt a syringe and foil,
which he suspected were drug paraphernalia, which led to his discovering drug paraphernalia and
a small knife; based on his discovery of those items, the officer placed Mr. Alexander in
handcuffs and searched his shirt pockets and backpack, discovering additional drug evidence
including several grams of heroin. (See, e.g., Tr., p.20, Ls.6-18; Prelim.Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.12,
L.17.)
The State charged Mr. Alexander with heroin trafficking and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.10-11, 24-25.) Mr. Ludwig filed a motion to suppress the evidence
asserting that the pat-down search4 was not consensual and done without reason to believe that
he was presently armed and dangerous, in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (R., pp.55-62.) The State filed a brief in opposition.
(R., pp.77-81.)
At the suppression hearing, Officer Ludwig testified that the gym-style basketball shorts
Mr. Alexander was wearing were being “weighed down by apparently several objects in his
pockets.”5 (Tr., p.17, Ls.5-8.) The officer testified he was concerned for his safety “based on
my observations of the female that the male had been notified to law enforcement’s presence and
that potentially the items in his pocket could be used as a weapon.” (Tr. p.17, Ls.21-22.) The
officer also testified he “was concerned about the presence of syringes.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.1-8.)
According to the officer, Mr. Alexander was sweating profusely, his eyes had a “glazed-over
kind of look to them” and was “moving very, very slowly as he exited the bathroom.” (Tr., p.16,

4

Trial counsel advised the district court that Mr. Alexander was not challenging the stop.
(Tr., p.31, Ls.4-6.)
4

L.20 – p.17, L.5; p.21, Ls.14-21; Prelim.Tr., p.21, Ls.19-21.) The officer testified that based on
these observations and his training and experience, he believed Mr. Alexander was under the
influence of a controlled substance. (Tr., p.17, Ls.12-16.) When asked about safety, the officer
stated,
Obviously people that are under the influence of controlled substances can act in
irrational or dangerous manners. An individual that is under the influence and has
access to a knife or syringe or anything else can become concerned about the level
of punishment that they’re potentially looking at, become frightened by the
presence of law enforcement and can lash out. …
And just dealing with you know, with drugs you’re typically dealing with
weapons.
(Tr., p.19, Ls.3-22.)
The district court denied Mr. Alexander’s motion to suppress.

(R., pp.84-91.)

Referencing the Idaho Supreme Court’s multi-factored inquiry set forth in State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 819 (2019), the district court concluded that Officer Ludwig was justified in
conducting the pat search based on its findings that the following factors were present:
(1) The Defendant had bulging pockets that resembled a weapon, (2) the
Defendant appeared nervous, (3) the Defendant appeared to be under the
influence of drugs, and (4) the Defendant was uncooperative to the extent that he
denied using or possession drugs. In addition to those factors, the officers had a
tip that the Defendant might be selling drugs from the bathroom and the officers
saw the female suspect send a text potentially alerting the Defendant about the
police presence. …
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Ludwig made a reasonable
inference that the defendant posed a safety risk or was potentially armed and
dangerous.
(R., p.91.) (Emphasis added.)

5

The video from Officer Ludwig’s bodycam does not show the area below Mr. Alexander’s
waist until after he turns around. (See generally, Ex.C.)
5

Mr. Alexander went to trial and the drug evidence was admitted. (See Tr., p.229, L.8 –
p.237, L.17.) The jury found Mr. Alexander guilty of both charges. (Tr., p.305, Ls.2-7.) The
district court sentenced Mr. Alexander to ten years, with three years fixed, on the trafficking
charge, and imposed a concurrent term of 90 days’ jail on the paraphernalia charge. (Tr., p.331,
Ls.10-15.) Mr. Alexander filed a Notice of Appeal timely from his judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.155-157.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Alexander’s motion to suppress?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Alexander’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Officer Ludwig violated Mr. Alexander’s Fourth Amendment rights when, without an

objective factual basis for suspecting Mr. Alexander was both armed and dangerous, the officer
conducted a pat search of his person for weapons. As set forth below, the district court’s
conclusion that the officer was justified in conducting a weapons search is based on factual
findings that are not supported by the record and results from a misinterpretation and
misapplication of the relevant factors identified in State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819 (2009).
The district court’s denial of suppression should be reversed and Mr. Alexander’s convictions
should be vacated.
B.

Standard Of Review
Review of a trial court’s decision denying a suppression motion is bifurcated. The

appellate court defers to the trial courts factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly
erroneous. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017). “This Court maintains free review,
however, over whether the facts surrounding the search and seizure satisfy constitutional
requirements.” Id.
The deference to the trial court’s factual findings reflects “the trial court’s special role to
weigh conflicting evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Anderson, 164 Idaho
309, 313 (2018). However, where the appellate court has exactly the same evidence before it as
was considered by the district court, the appellate court does not extend the usual deference to
the district court’s evaluation of the evidence. Id. “Under these limited circumstances, the
appellate court’s role is to freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence in the same manner
8

as the trial court would do.” Id., 164 Idaho at 313 (citing State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 492
(2017)).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Suppression Because The Officer’s Pat-Down
Search Was Not Justified By A Reasonable Belief That Mr. Alexander Was Armed And
Presently Dangerous
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires all evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result
of the illegal search or seizure, i.e., the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” to be excluded. E.g., Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804
(1984) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)); State v. Downing, 163
Idaho 26, 30 (2017).
A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant
requirement exists. Downing, 163 Idaho at 30. “One such exception allows an officer to
conduct a limited self-protective pat down search of a detainee in order to remove any weapons.”
Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).

The “stop and frisk” decisions begin

with Ohio v. Terry, and its holding that:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).

9

Thus, a pat search, or weapons “frisk,” is only justified “when, at the moment of the frisk,
the officer has reason to believe that the individual he or she is investigating is ‘armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to others’ and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
dispels the officer's belief.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 817 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24,
30) (emphasis added). “The test is an objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual
posed a risk of danger.” Bishop, at 817 (citing State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660–61 (2007)
and Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.) “To satisfy this standard, the officer must indicate ‘specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’ in light of his or
her experience, justify the officer’s suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous.”
Bishop, at 888-19; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
Even if there are grounds to justify a lawful investigatory stop, such grounds do not
automatically justify a frisk for weapons. State v. Freeland, 162 Idaho 532, 533 (Ct. App. 2017).
An officer may frisk an individual only if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts
that would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the individual with whom the officer
is dealing is armed and presently dangerous and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel this belief. Id.
In Bishop, the Idaho Supreme Court gleaned from Terry and its progeny6 eight, nonexclusive, factors that influence whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would
conclude that a particular individual was armed and dangerous:

6

The Court cited the following: Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho at 661–62; State v.
Davenport, 144 Idaho 99, 103 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 292 (Ct.
App. 2001); State v. Babb, 133 Idaho 890, 893 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Simmons, 120 Idaho
672, 677 (Ct. App. 1991).
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[1] whether there were any bulges in the suspect's clothing that resembled
a weapon; [2] whether the encounter took place late at night or in a high crime
area; and [3] whether the individual made threatening or furtive movements, [4]
indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, [5] appeared nervous or agitated, [6]
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, [7] was unwilling to
cooperate, [8] or had a reputation for being dangerous.
146 Idaho 804, 819 (2009). The Court stated that, “Whether any of these considerations, taken
together or by themselves, are enough to justify a Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. The Court also emphasized that the frisk must be justified
based on objective facts, and that an officer’s subjective feeling that his safety was compromised
is irrelevant under the objective totality of the circumstances analysis. Bishop, at 819.
As explained below, the district court’s application of the Bishop factors is flawed, as it
relies on factual findings that are not supported by the record, and on an apparent
misunderstanding and resulting misapplication of the law. Upon a correct application of the
Bishop factors to the facts properly found, and to the undisputed evidence in the record, it is clear
that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the objective facts known to the officer at
the moment of the search justified a belief that Mr. Alexander was armed and dangerous.
1.

The District Court’s Finding That Mr. Alexander “Had Bulging Pockets That
Resembled A Weapon” Is Not Supported By The Record And Is Clearly
Erroneous

Under the first Bishop factor, the district court found that “the Defendant had bulging
pockets that resembled a weapon.” (R., p.91.) The record, however, does not support this
finding. The video does not show Mr. Alexander’s shorts’ pockets and the officer never testified
that what he observed “resembled a weapon.”
The video and officer testimony show that Mr. Alexander was wearing gym basketballstyle shorts as he exited the bathroom. (Tr., p.17, Ls.5-8; See generally Ex.C.) While the video
does not show Mr. Alexander’s shorts’ front pockets as he stepped out of the bathroom (see
11

generally Ex.C, 00:44 -1:11), Officer Ludwig described what he observed at that time. The
officer described the shorts as being big “baggy shorts.” (Prelim.Tr., p.8, Ls.1-3.) He testified
he noticed “there were several items in his pocket that were weighing down his basketball
shorts” (Prelim.Tr., p.7, Ls.21-23), and that based on the apparent texting from the female and
the “weight and unknown objects in his pockets” he conducted the pat search “just to make sure
there weren’t any weapons” (Prelim.Tr., p.8, L.8-12). At the preliminary hearing, when asked
what it was that made him believe the pockets contained a weapon, the officer answered,
“because of the weight of it, I felt that there could be a firearm in the wallet – or in – in the
pockets.” (Prelim.Tr., p.18, Ls.11-13.) Subsequently, at the suppression hearing, the officer
testified that, “the shorts were being weighed down by several objects in his pockets” (Tr., p.17,
Ls.5-8), and that he was concerned “potentially the items in his pockets could be utilized as a
weapon” (Tr., p.17, Ls.21-22).
Nowhere in the officer’s testimony does he suggest that what he observed “resembled a
weapon.” The officer does not indicate the items appeared to have a weight that was different
from items that are commonly carried in a man’s front pockets, like keys, coins, or a cellphone.
(See generally, Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.29, L.14; Prelim.Tr., p.4, L.5 – p.25, L.17.) Rather, the officer
described them as “unknown objects” and said only that “there could be a firearm in there” and
that he conducted the pat search “just to make sure there weren’t any.” (Prelim.Tr., p.8, Ls.812.)
Moreover, as the Idaho Supreme Court noted in Bishop,
The fact that Bishop “could possibly” be carrying a weapon does not distinguish him
from any other individual the police encounter. An officer can never be sure whether a
person is carrying a weapon because Idaho law authorizes individuals to carry concealed
weapons once they obtain a permit. See I.C. § 18–3302. If an officer’s bare assertion that
a suspect “could possibly” be carrying a weapon was enough to establish that a person
posed a risk of danger, officers could frisk any person with whom they come into contact.

12

146 Idaho 804, 819 n.13.
Because there is no evidence to support the district court’s erroneous finding, under the
first Bishop factor, of any bulge observed in Mr. Alexander’s clothing “that resembled a
weapon,” the district court erred in considering this as a factor in its analysis of totality of the
circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the search.

2.

The Encounter Did Not Take Place Late At Night Or In A High Crime Area

The second Bishop consideration is whether the encounter took place late at night or in a
high crime area. 146 Idaho at 819. It is undisputed that the encounter took place inside the Blue
Sky Bagel on Fairview Avenue, in Meridian, on a June afternoon. (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-14; R., p.85.)
There is no finding or evidence to suggest this was an area or establishment known for its crime.
(See generally, Tr., p.11, Ls.9-14.) Thus, the time and location of the encounter lend no support
to a reasonable belief that Mr. Alexander was armed and presently dangerous.

3.

Mr. Alexander Made No Threatening Or Furtive Movements

The third Bishop factor asks whether the individual “made threatening or furtive
movements.” 146 Idaho at 819. A review of Officer Ludwig’s body video and the officer’s own
testimony demonstrates that Mr. Alexander was calm and his movements remarkably slow when
the officer accosted him outside the bathroom. (See Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) Mr. Alexander was
standing, in full view of the officer; his hands were empty and held out where the officer could
see them. (See Ex. C, 00:44 – 1:10.) At no point did Mr. Alexander ever attempt to put his
hands in his pockets or make quick movements. (Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) On the contrary, in the
words of the officer, Mr. Alexander was “moving very, very slowly as he exited the bathroom”
and even his speech was “slow paced.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.14-21; Prelim.Tr., p.29, Ls.19-21.) Nor did
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the officer testify that Mr. Alexander made any type of movement that concerned him. (See
generally, Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.29, L.14; Prelim.Tr., p.4, L.5 – p.25, L.17.)
Instead, Officer Ludwig testified that his safety concern was based on his belief that
while Mr. Alexander was in the bathroom, the female had sent him texts alerting him to law
enforcement’s presence.

(Prelim.Tr., p.8, Ls.8-12; Tr., p.17, Ls.5-22.)

The officer never

articulated how or why alerting Mr. Alexander to the officers was connected to officer safety.
(See generally, Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.29, L.14; Prelim.Tr., p.4, L.5 – p.25, L.17.) However, to the
extent Officer Ludwig feared that the texts might prompt Mr. Alexander to attack the officers,
that fear would have been dispelled once Mr. Alexander had stepped out of the bathroom, with
empty hands visible to the officer, and with movements that were slow and non-threatening.
The facts in this case are like those in Henage, wherein the Idaho Supreme Court
concluded the objective facts did not justify the officer’s pat search. 143 Idaho at 622. Like the
defendant in Henage, Mr. Alexander made no suspicious movements for his pockets or other
areas from which a weapon might be readily retrieved. Id.
4.

Mr. Alexander Did Not Indicate That He Had A Weapon

A review of the record makes clear that, prior to the pat search, Mr. Alexander did not
indicate to the officer that he had a weapon. (See Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) Thus, there is no
justification for the pat search under the fourth Bishop factor.
5.

Mr. Alexander Did Not Appear Nervous Or Agitated, Contrary To Finding Of
The District Court

The district court’s finding, made under Bishop’s fifth factor, that Mr. Alexander
appeared to be nervous (R., p.91), is not supported by the record and is clearly erroneous.
Although the prosecutor argued to the district court that Mr. Alexander had appeared nervous to

14

the officer (Tr., p.35, Ls.13-14), neither Officer Ludwig’s testimony nor the video from his
bodycam support such a finding.

First, Officer Ludwig did not testify that he thought or

perceived Mr. Alexander to be nervous or agitated. (See generally, Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.29, L.14;
Prelim.Tr., p.4, L.5 – p.25, L.17.)7 On the contrary, the officer described Mr. Alexander as
“moving very, very slowly as he exited the bathroom” and his speech was “slow paced.”
(Tr., p.21, Ls.14-21; Prelim.Tr., p.219, Ls.19-21.) Officer Ludwig testified that Mr. Alexander
was sweating profusely, but the officer repeatedly attributed this symptom to the use and
influence of some controlled substance. (Tr., p.16, L.20 – p.17, L.17.)
Second, as this Court will see upon its review of the same video, Mr. Alexander’s
behavior as he stepped out of the bathroom and was confronted by the officer does not show that
he was “nervous or agitated.” (See Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) Just as the officer had described, the
video shows that Mr. Alexander was “moving very, very slowly” and that his speech, likewise,
was “slow paced.”

(See Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.)

Mr. Alexander appears congenial, even if

bewildered by having been accosted by a uniformed officer. (See Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) As is
evident from the video, there is nothing in Mr. Alexander’s behavior, actions, or manners that
shows a nervousness that is in any way indicative of dangerousness.
6.

Officer Ludwig’s Generalized Statements Regarding Possible Behaviors Of
Persons Under The Influence Failed To Justify An Individualized Suspicion That
Mr. Alexander Was Armed And Presently Dangerous

Although it appeared to Officer Ludwig that Mr. Alexander was under the influence of

7

At one point during his question of the officer, the prosecutor stated, incorrectly, “you said he
appeared nervous,” and then asked, “Was that especially a concern for you?” (Tr., p.19, Ls.1416.) Although Officer Ludwig answered “Yes,” the explanation that followed made clear he was
referring to Mr. Alexander’s drug use; Officer Ludwig never mentioned nervousness nor
described nervous behavior that he believed was indicative of dangerousness. (Tr., p.19, Ls.1721; see generally, Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.29, L.24; Prelim.Tr., p.5, L.3 – p.25, L.9.)
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drugs, the officer’s generalized statement regarding possible behaviors of people who are under
the influence, was insufficient to support the required individualized suspicion that
Mr. Alexander was armed and dangerous. Officer Ludwig testified that, “Obviously people that
are under the influence of controlled substances can act in irrational or dangerous manners.”
(Tr., p.19, Ls.3-5 (emphasis added).)

However, such a generalized statement “does not

constitute the type of specific articulable fact necessary to justify initiating a search under
Terry.” See Henage, 143 Idaho 662. Like the officer in Henage, Officer Ludwig failed to
particularize his general statement about how “people … can act” to Mr. Alexander whose actual
behavior, as shown in the video, was calm and non-threatening, and neither irrational nor
dangerous.
Additionally, Mr. Alexander was observed by Blue Sky employees for extensive periods
of time inside the restaurant, that day and the day before, but there is no evidence or any
complaint of disruptive or aggressive behavior. Moreover, Officer Ludwig himself observed
that, when he knocked on the bathroom door, he heard movement inside “but nothing that I
deemed alarming,” (Tr., p.14, L.24 – p.15, L.2), and that after Mr. Alexander stepped out of the
bathroom he was calm and polite, and moved and spoke slowly (See Tr., p.21, Ls.14-21;
Prelim.Tr., p.219, Ls.19-21; Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10).
Thus, not only was the officer’s general statement about “people that are under influence”
not particularized to Mr. Alexander, the evidence showing Mr. Alexander’s actual conduct and
demeanor served to dispel any reasonable fear of Mr. Alexander acting in an irrational or
dangerous manner.
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7.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Mr. Alexander Was
“Uncooperative” When He Denied Using Or Possessing Drugs

The seventh Bishop factor asks whether the defendant “was unwilling to cooperate.” 146
Idaho at 819. The district court erred in its application of this factor when it concluded that
Mr. Alexander was “uncooperative to the extent that he denied using or possessing drugs.”
(R., p.91.) The district court appears to have misunderstood the meaning of “willingness to
cooperate” used in Bishop, to mean admitting to the officer’s accusations of criminal conduct,
which has no bearing on the analysis of whether there is a reason to believe the individual is
armed and dangerous.
The officer’s questioning and Mr. Alexander’s responses prior8 to the pat search was as
follows:
Officer Ludwig:

What’s going on with your wrist?

Mr. Alexander:

I have, like a, abscess.

Officer Ludwig:

You have an abscess? ’Kay. Is that from drug use?

Mr. Alexander:

Um. [Shrugs]

Officer Ludwig:

I can see your arm.

Mr. Alexander:

Yah.

Officer Ludwig:

You shoot up in the bathroom?

Mr. Alexander:

No, I did not.

Officer Ludwig:

Do me a favor. Put your hands on top of your head and
lace Your fingers for me….

(Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.)

8

After he began the search, the officer asked additional, rapid-fire questions about what was in
the pockets; as this Court can see from the video, Mr. Alexander’s shorts are being manipulated
by the officer before Mr. Alexander answers these questions. (See, Ex.C, 01:15-25).
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Mr. Alexander’s denial of the officer’s very specific accusation, “You shoot up in the
bathroom?” may well have been true; in any event, his denial does not show an unwillingness to
cooperate that is indicative of dangerousness under Bishop’s totality of the circumstances
analysis.
Moreover, the district court’s finding that Mr. Alexander was “uncooperative” within the
meaning of Bishop is not supported by the evidence and is clearly erroneous. Officer Ludwig’s
bodycam video affirmatively demonstrates that prior to the pat search, Mr. Alexander was
wholly cooperative and that he complied, completely, with all of Officer Ludwig’s instructions
and commands. (See Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) Mr. Alexander came out of the bathroom in response
to the officer’s knock at the door; when the officer asked for ID, Mr. Alexander told him where it
was and offered to retrieve it; and when the officer told him to place his hands on his head,
lacing his fingers, and indicated for him to turn around, Mr. Alexander obeyed immediately and
without questions or complaints. (See Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) The district court’s finding and
conclusion that Mr. Alexander was “uncooperative” was erroneous and cannot be considered as a
factor to justify Officer Ludwig’s decision to conduct a weapons search.
8.

There Is No Evidence That Mr. Alexander Had A Reputation For Dangerousness

Although not commented upon by the district court, there is no evidence that
Mr. Alexander had a reputation of being a dangerous person. (See generally, Tr., p.7, L.21 –
p.29, L.24; Prelim.Tr., p.5, L.3 – p.25, L.9.) As noted above, the police received reports that
Mr. Alexander was observed in the bagel restaurant spending extended periods of time, on two
separate days, going back and forth to the bathroom. (Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.21.) There was
no report of any aggressive, violent, or other dangerous behaviors by Mr. Alexander during these
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periods, and no other evidence that he was known or believed by anyone to be dangerous. (See
generally, Tr., p.7, L.21 – pp.29-24; Prelim.Tr., p.5, L.3 – p.25, L.9.)
9.

The Non-Bishop Factors Relied Upon By The District Court Do Not Support A
Reasonable Suspicion That Mr. Alexander Was Armed And Presently Dangerous

The district court cited additional facts as justification for Officer Ludwig’s conduct of
weapons search: the “tip” from the bagel shop employee who “believed Mr. Alexander might be
selling drugs”; and the officer’s belief that the female was sending texts to Mr. Ludwig while he
was in the bathroom. (R., p.91.) For the reasons below, neither one of these facts supports a
reasonable belief, at the time of the pat search, that Mr. Alexander was armed and dangerous.
a.

The Caller’s Purported “Tip” Lacked An Objective Factual Basis

Contrary to the district court’s analysis (R., p.91), the fact the officer received a “tip” that
the bagel shop employee believed Mr. Alexander “might be selling drugs from the bathroom”
cannot be used to justify Officer Ludwig’s pat search, because that the tip was not supported by
sufficient objective, articulable facts. While it is true that an officer’s reasonable suspicion for
Terry stop and frisk may be based on information supplied by a third person, see Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), the
“reasonable suspicion” required to justify the officer’s actions “is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325, 330, 1 (1990); see also State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 708 (Ct. App. 2007).
The bagel shop employee’s “tip” that Mr. Alexander was “selling drugs” provided neither. The
information consists solely of the facts that (1) Mr. Alexander and a female had been spending
extended periods of time in the restaurant that day, and the day before, going back and forth
between the bathroom, and (2) a small plastic Ziploc bag with skull markings was found in a
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trash can. (Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.21; Prelim.Tr., p.17, Ls.1-10.) However, there is no
testimony or other evidence that indicated the significance of a baggie with skull markings, or
that connected this baggie to Mr. Alexander prior to the time of the pat search. Nor is there any
evidence of suspected drug transactions. (See generally, Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.29, L.24; Prelim.Tr.,
p.5, L.3 – p.25, L.9.) Like an “officer’s hunch,” a tipster’s unsupported speculation or concern
that a crime may be taking place cannot justify a warrantless search or seizure. State v. ZapataReyes, 144 Idaho 703, 708 (Ct. App. 2007). Thus, the caller’s unsupported speculation that
Mr. Alexander might be selling drugs cannot serve as a factor, in the totality of the circumstances
analysis, to justify a reasonable believe that Mr. Alexander was armed and dangerous.
b.

Officer Ludwig’s Observation Of The Female Potentially Sending Texts
To Mr. Alexander While He Was In The Bathroom Did Not Justify A
Reasonable Belief That Mr. Alexander Was Armed And Dangerous

Officer Ludwig’s observation of the female texting while Mr. Alexander was in the
bathroom and potentially alerting him to the presence of the police did not provide justification
for a belief that Mr. Alexander was armed and dangerous, because the officer’s subsequent
observations of Mr. Alexander as he stepped out of the bathroom served to dispel any reasonable
fear of attack.
Officer Ludwig testified that, because he believed the woman was notifying the male in
the bathroom about the officers’ presence, he went immediately to the bathroom and knocked on
the door. (Prelim.Tr., p.8, Ls.8-12; Tr., p.17, Ls.5-22.) Officer Ludwig did not articulate why
the texting presented a safety concern; however, to the extent he feared that the texts might
prompt Mr. Alexander to attack the officers, the officer’s subsequent observations would have
served to dispel such fear. After he knocked on the bathroom door, Officer Ludwig detected
movement inside but “nothing that I deemed alarming, at that time.” (Tr., p.14, L.24 – p.15,
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L.2.) Mr. Alexander stepped out of the bathroom, in compliance with the officer’s request;
Mr. Alexander spoke and moved calmly and slowly, with empty hands that were visible to the
officer. (See Ex.C, 00:44 – 1:10.) Accord Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (holding
weapons pat search was unjustified where defendant’s hands were empty, he gave no indication
of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent to commit an
assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not threatening). The fact the officer had
observed the woman texting prior to his encounter with Mr. Alexander, does not provide
justification for reasonable belief, at the moment of the pat search, that Mr. Alexander was armed
and presently dangerous.
Application of the Bishop factors, under the totality of the circumstances analysis, shows
that a reasonable person in Officer Ludwig’s position would not conclude that Mr. Alexander
was armed and presently dangerous. The encounter occurred in a restaurant in the middle of a
summer day. Mr. Alexander and the female had been observed for extensive periods of time,
that day and the day before, without any reported incident of disruptive, violent, or erratic
behavior. Mr. Alexander was wearing gym basketball shorts and carried items in his pockets,
but nothing that resembled a weapon. Even if the texting female led the officer to fear that
Mr. Alexander was in the bathroom planning to attack, such fear was dispelled once the officer
observed Mr. Alexander step out of the bathroom, empty handed, and politely engage with the
officer. Officer Ludwig’s generalized statements about the possible actions of persons under the
influence of drugs were neither particularized to Mr. Alexander nor consistent with the evidence
of Mr. Alexander’s actual demeanor or conduct.
The totality of the circumstances in this case are insufficient to support a reasonable
belief that, at the moment of the pat search, Mr. Alexander was armed and presently dangerous.
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Officer Ludwig’s search of Mr. Alexander for weapons was constitutionally unlawful, and the
district court’s denial of Mr. Alexander’s motion to suppress was erroneous. The drug evidence
discovered as the result of the unlawful frisk should not have been admitted at Mr. Alexander’s
trial and the judgment, entered upon the jury’s verdicts convicting him of trafficking in heroin
and possession of the drug paraphernalia, should be vacated.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Alexander respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
suppression, vacate his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia, and remand his case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 12th day of February, 2019.
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